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Abstract 
This paper elaborates on the relationship between sustainability of public debt and the debt to GDP ratio in case the 
interest rate on public debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP. When the primary surplus relative to GDP positively 
reacts to a higher debt to GDP ratio, a bounded debt to GDP ratio guarantees sustainability. Further, an unbounded 
debt to GDP ratio is not compatible with sustainability, even if the primary surplus relative to GDP strictly rises as the 
debt to GDP ratio increases. Finally, sustainability is excluded if the initial debt to GDP ratio exceeds a critical 
threshold.
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1. Introduction
Modern research on sustainability of debt policies that apply statistical tests has started
with the contribution by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) who analyzed whether the series of
public debt in the USA contains a bubble term. Since then a great many papers have been
written that try to answer the question of whether given debt policies can be considered
as sustainable. The interest in that question is in part due to the fact that the latter
question is not only of academic interest but that it has practical relevance, too. Hence,
if tests reach the conclusion that given debt policies cannot be considered as sustainable
governments should undertake corrective actions.
An important role in many of those studies on sustainability plays the interest rate,
an aspect that was pointed out by Wilcox (1989) for example. Recalling that the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the government requires that the present value of public
debt asymptotically converges to zero, the role of the interest rate that is resorted to
in order to discount the stream of public debt becomes immediately clear. Therefore,
tests have been conceived that reach results which are independent of the interest rate.
One such test is to analyze whether public de¯cits inclusive of interest payments grow
at most linearly, as suggested by Trehan and Walsh (1991). If that property is ful¯lled
a given series of public debt is sustainable because any time series that grows linearly
converges to zero if it is exponentially discounted, provided the real interest rate is positive.
Denoting by B public debt and by r the interest rate, another test proposed by Trehan
and Walsh (1991) is to analyze whether a quasi-di®erence of public debt, Bt ¡ ¸Bt¡1
with 0 · ¸ < 1 + r, is stationary and whether public debt and primary surpluses are co-
integrated. If government debt is quasi-di®erence stationary and public debt are primary
surpluses are conitegrated, ¯scal policy is sustainable. Hence, these two tests present
alternatives where the outcome is independent of the exact numerical value of the interest
rate. A survey of analyses that tested on sustainability of debt policies can be found in
Afonso (2005).
Another test that has received great attention in the economics literature is the one
proposed by Bohn (1995). There, it is suggested to test whether the primary surplus
relative to GDP is a positive and at least linearly rising function of the debt to GDP
ratio. If that property holds, a given public debt policy can be sustainable. This test
is very plausible because it has a nice economic intuition: if governments run into debt
today they have to take corrective actions in the future by increasing the primary surplus
relative to GDP. Otherwise, public debt will not be sustainable. Testing real-world debt
policies for that property one can indeed ¯nd evidence that countries behave like that
(see e.g. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2005, or Greiner et al., 2007, for countries of
the euro area).
From a statistical point of view, a rise in primary surpluses as a response to higher
government debt implies that the series of public debt relative to GDP should become a
mean-reverting process. This holds because higher debt ratios lead to an increase in the
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primary surplus relative to GDP, making the debt ratio decline and return to its mean.
However, mean-reversion only holds if the reaction coe±cient, determining how strongly
the primary surplus reacts as public debt rises, is su±ciently large, as will be shown in
detail in this paper.
In this note, our goal is to elaborate on that test from a theoretical point of view. In
particular, we are interested in the behavior of the debt to GDP ratio when governments
pursue sustainable debt policies. For example, one question we address is whether a
sustainable debt policy is compatible with a rising debt to GDP ratio. Another question
we study is whether sustainability can be given if the government does not react to rising
debt ratios and whether there probably exists a critical initial debt ratio that makes a
sustainable debt policy impossible.
The remainder is organized as follows. In section two the period and the inter-temporal
budget constraints of the government are introduced. Section three analyzes under which
conditions sustainability of public debt is assured and section four, ¯nally, concludes the
note.
2. Public debt and the budget constraint
We consider a real economy and we posit that the government cannot use seignorage or
in°ation to reduce its outstanding debt.
Starting point for the analysis of sustainability of public debt, then, is the accounting
identity describing the accumulation of public debt in continuous time by the following
di®erential equation:
_ B(t) = r(t)B(t) ¡ S(t); (1)
with B(t) real public debt1 at time t, r(t) the real interest rate, S(t) the real government
surplus exclusive of interest payments on public debt and the dot over a variable stands
for the derivative with respect to time d=dt. A government is said to follow a sustainable
debt policy if the present value of public debt converges to zero asymptotically, i.e. if
it does not play a Ponzi game. This implies that limt!1 e¡C1(t)B(t) = 0 holds, with
C1(t) =
R t
0 r(¹)d¹ (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, chapter 2).
In the next section, we analyze conditions that must be ful¯lled such that the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the government holds and how the debt to GDP ratio
evolves in that case.
3. Conditions for sustainability of public debt
Before we start our analysis we make two additional assumptions. First, we posit that
the interest rate on government bonds exceeds the growth rate of GDP on average so that R
r(¹)d¹ >
R
g(¹)d¹; with g denoting the growth rate of GDP. We make this assumption
1Strictly speaking, B should be real public net debt.
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because otherwise the inter-temporal budget constraint would not pose a problem for
the government since it can grow out of debt in that case. In addition, this condition is
ful¯lled for countries of the euro area at least since the 1980's. Second, we neglect the
case where public debt becomes negative meaning that the government would be a net
lender. This is done for reasons of realism because a situation with negative public debt
is of less relevance for countries in the euro are.
In our analysis of sustainable debt policies we are particularly interested under which
conditions sustainability of public debt is given and in the question of whether a sustain-
able debt policy is compatible with a rising debt to GDP ratio. First, we analyze the
situation where the primary surplus is a function of the debt to GDP ratio.
3.1 The primary surplus as a function of public debt
Assume that the government in the economy chooses the primary surplus to GDP ratio,
s(t) = S(t)=Y (t); such that it is a positive linear function of the debt to GDP ratio,
b(t) = B(t)=Y (t); and of an autonomous term that is independent of public debt, ®(t)
(cf. Bohn, 1995, or Canzoneri et al., 2001). The primary surplus ratio, then, can be
written as
s(t) = ¯(t)b(t) + ®(t); (2)
where ¯(t) is the coe±cient determining how strong the primary surplus reacts to changes
in the public debt ratio and that is time-varying. It should be noted that any non-linear
model can be approximated by a linear model with time-varying coe±cients. Further,
the approximation is good if the parameter changes smoothly (cf. Granger, 2008). Thus,
the modelling in (2) can be justi¯ed and there does not seem to be the need for a more
general function describing the response of the primary surplus to public debt.
The term ®(t) is also time dependent and it is in°uenced by other economic variables,
such as social spending or transitory government expenditures in general. As concerns
®(t) we suppose that it is bounded by above and by below by a certain ¯nite number that
is constant over time. We should also like to point out that ®(t) cannot be completely
controlled by the government. The government can in°uence that parameter to a certain
degree but has not complete control over it because ®(t) is also a®ected by the business
cycle for example that can a®ect temporary government outlays.
To study sustainability of public debt, we combine equation (1) and (2) yielding
_ B(t) = (r(t) ¡ ¯(t))B(t) ¡ ®(t)Y (t): (3)
With (3), the debt to GDP ratio evolves according to
_ b(t) = (r(t) ¡ ¯(t))b(t) ¡ ®(t) ¡ g(t)b(t): (4)
With these two equations, we can derive our ¯rst result in proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 Assume that the upper bound of the primary surplus to GDP ratio is not
binding. Then, a strictly positive reaction coe±cient on average so that
R t
0 ¯(¹)d¹ = 1





0 (r(¹) ¡ g(¹))d¹, the debt to GDP ratio converges to a constant




0 (r(¹) ¡ g(¹))d¹; for t ! 1 respectively.
Proof: See Appendix.
This proposition demonstrates that a positive reaction coe±cient on average is su±-
cient for sustainability of public debt.2 If the reaction coe±cient is strictly negative on
average, the discounted value of public debt diverges to in¯nity. But proposition 1 also
shows that a positive value of the reaction coe±cient does not necessarily imply that the
debt to GDP ratio remains constant or that it asymptotically converges to a constant.
Only if the reaction coe±cient exceeds the positive di®erence between the interest rate
and the GDP growth rate on average, convergence can be guaranteed. Otherwise, the
debt to GDP ratio diverges to in¯nity.
With the result of proposition 1, one could reach the conclusion that a sustainable debt
policy is compatible with a continuously rising debt to GDP ratio, in case the reaction
coe±cient ¯ is positive on average but smaller than the di®erence between the average
interest rate and the average growth rate, r ¡ g. However, when the government sets
the primary surplus according to rule (2), that possibility is not given as proposition 2
demonstrates.
Proposition 2 If the government pursues a sustainable debt policy and sets the primary
surplus according to the rule given by (2), the debt to GDP ratio remains bounded.
Proof: Assume that b(t) ! 1. According to (2) this implies s(t) ! 1 which, however,
is excluded because the primary surplus cannot become larger than GDP implying that
s(t) < 1 must always hold. 2
The result in proposition 2 is due to the fact that an unbounded debt to GDP ratio
would require that the primary surplus to GDP ratio goes to in¯nity which, however, is
not possible since the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP is bounded by above. This
holds because the primary surplus must be ¯nanced out of GDP so that the ratio of
the primary surplus to GDP must be smaller one. Consequently, when the government
pursues a sustainable debt policy and raises the primary surplus relative to GDP as the
debt to GDP ratio increases, the debt ratio must remain bounded in the long-run.
Hence, a situation may be observed where the debt to GDP ratio rises over a certain
time period although the primary surplus positively reacts to higher public debt. Such an
evolution of public debt may be compatible with a sustainable debt policy but it cannot
go on forever. Sooner or later, the public debt to GDP ratio must become constant or
converge to zero. Otherwise, sustainability is not given.
2That has already been shown in Greiner (2008) for example. We repeat it here for reasons of
readability and for completeness of the presentation.
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3.2 The primary surplus independent of public debt
In the last subsection it was assumed that the government sets the primary surplus ac-
cording to the rule speci¯ed in equation (2). However, one could argue that governments
can perform sustainable debt policies without reacting to higher public debt if they only
chose the primary surplus su±ciently high, independent of public debt. Further, a situa-
tion is feasible where the government cannot react to higher debt since there is no scope
for it because the primary surplus relative to GDP has already reached its upper bound.
In both cases the reaction coe±cient ¯(t) would be zero.
In order to analyze that case we set ¯(t) = 0 and we denote by m < 1 the constant
upper bound of the primary surplus to GDP ratio. In addition, we assume that the
government sets the primary surplus to GDP ratio equal to that maximum value for all
times, i.e. s(t) = m for all t. Thus, the evolution of public debt is described by
_ B(t) = r(t)B(t) ¡ mY (t) (5)
and the debt to GDP ratio evolves according to
_ b(t) = r(t)b(t) ¡ m ¡ g(t)b(t): (6)
Given equation (5) and equation (6), we can derive proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Assume that the initial debt to GDP ratio exceeds a threshold given by
bcrit = m
R 1
0 e¡(C1(¹)¡C2(¹))d¹; with C1(¹) =
R ¹
0 r(º)dº, C2(¹) =
R ¹
0 g(º)dº, then a sus-
tainable debt policy is excluded.
If the initial debt to GDP ratio is smaller than or equal to the critical threshold, the
government can pursue a sustainable debt policy. In this case, the debt to GDP ratio
becomes zero.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that a sustainable debt policy cannot be pursued if the initial
debt to GDP ratio is larger than a certain critical value. The critical value depends on
how large the primary surplus relative to GDP can maximally become, m; and on the
average di®erence between the interest rate and the growth rate, r ¡ g. Hence, countries
that do not stabilize their debt to GDP ratio but instead let it grow for a longer time
period face the risk that they ¯nd themselves in a situation where they cannot react to
higher debt to GDP ratios by raising their primary surplus relative to GDP. Then, it
may become impossible to pursue a sustainable debt policy, independent of how large
the primary surplus relative to GDP is set. In this case, the public debt to GDP ratio
becomes unbounded asymptotically.
The proposition also demonstrates that the government can control public debt if it
chooses the maximally possible value of the primary surplus, m, provided the initial debt
to GDP ratio is not too large, i.e. if it is smaller than the critical value bcrit. In that case,
sustainability of public debt is guaranteed and the debt to GDP ratio becomes zero.
3316Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3311-3319
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied conditions under which governments can pursue sustainable
debt policies. When the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of GDP on average, a given
debt policy is sustainable if the primary surplus relative to GDP is a positive function of
the debt to GDP ratio on average that exceeds the average di®erence between the interest
rate and the GDP growth rate. If a government pursues such a policy the debt to GDP
ratio converges to a constant. We could also demonstrate that a public debt to GDP ratio
which rises in the long-run is not compatible with a sustainable debt policy.
If the primary surplus relative to GDP does not react to a rising debt ratio, a sustain-
able debt policy is excluded if the initial debt to GDP ratio exceeds a certain threshold,
independent of how large the primary surplus is chosen.3 If the initial debt to GDP ra-
tio is smaller than the critical value it is possible that public debt remains sustainable
provided the ratio of the primary surplus relative to GDP is su±ciently large.
A Proof of proposition 1
To prove that proposition we note that the evolution of public debt is given by equation
(3). Integrating that equation and multiplying the resulting expression by e¡
R t
0 r(¿)d¿ to
get present values gives,
e
¡C1(t)B(t) = e



















For limt!1 C3(t) = limt!1
R t
0 ¯(º)dº = 1, the ¯rst term on the right hand side in
(A:1), i.e. e¡C3(t) B(0), converges to zero.





Since j®j < 1 we can set ®Y (0) = 1. If
R 1
0 e¡C1(¹)+C2(¹)+C3(¹)d¹ remains bounded
limt!1 C3(t) = 1 guarantees that K1 converges to zero. If limt!1
R 1
0 e¡C1(¹)+C2(¹)+C3(¹)








3Of course, the primary surplus is bounded by above and strictly smaller than GDP.
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Since ¡C1(t) + C2(t) < 0 we can ¯nd a constant k > 0 such that K1 · e¡kt=¯(t): The
right hand side in the former inequality does not converge to zero if ¯(t) converged to zero
exponentially. However, in that case limt!1
R t
0 ¯(¹)d¹ < 1 would hold. Consequently,
in case that limt!1
R t
0 ¯(¹)d¹ = 1 holds, ¯(t) cannot decline exponentially, and K1(t)
converges to zero.
These considerations demonstrate that the inter-temporal budget constraint holds
for limt!1
R t
0 ¯(¹)d¹ = 1 which means that the reaction coe±cient ¯(t) is positive on
average.








That expression shows that the debt ratio diverges to plus or minus in¯nity for
R t
0 ¯(¹)d¹ · R t
0 (r(¹) ¡ g(¹))d¹; while it converges in all other cases. 2
B Proof of proposition 3
To prove that proposition we note that the present value of public debt is now obtained
from (5) as
e





The inter-temporal budget constraint is ful¯lled for limt!1 e¡C1(t)B(t) = 0 which implies
b(0) = m
R 1
0 e¡(C1(¹)¡C2(¹))d¹. If the initial debt to GDP ratio, b(0), is larger than
m
R 1
0 e¡(C1(¹)¡C2(¹))d¹ sustainability of public debt is excluded.











If the inter-temporal budget constraint holds we have b(0) = m
R 1
0 e¡(C1(¹)¡C2(¹))d¹ and,
thus, limt!1 b(t) = 0. 2
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